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I.

INTRODUCTION

[1]
Bad facts make bad law. The Supreme Court recently addressed
the issue of what constitutes the appropriate standard of proof for
invalidating an issued patent. 1 The Patent Act provides a presumption of
patent validity. 2 Therefore, a party challenging a patent’s validity bears
the burden of overcoming this presumption. 3 However, the Patent Act is
silent as to the standard of proof required to satisfy this burden. 4 Despite
the Act’s silence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
* John Morrissett is a patent agent and third year law student at the University of
Richmond School of Law. He would especially like to thank Professor Kristen Osenga
for her invaluable guidance and assistance in publishing this article.
1

See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2244 (2011).

2

35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).

3

Id.

4

See B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A
Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 394 (2008) (“The statute is silent about the standard of
proof.”). See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282 (showing that the statute fails to provide a
standard of proof to satisfy the burden of overcoming a patent's presumed validity).

1
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(“Federal Circuit”) has consistently held that the Patent Act’s presumption
of validity can only be overcome by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence. 5 Major players in the patent field, including Google, filed an
amicus brief to the Supreme Court, arguing for the standard to be lowered
to preponderance of the evidence. 6 Despite the unusual facts of the case,
the Supreme Court correctly chose not to lower the required standard of
proof. 7 While lowering the standard of proof has appeal in certain
instances, it would damage the patent system and stifle innovation because
the enforceability of a patent would remain questionable until litigation or
beyond.
[2]
It is easier to understand the ripple effect resulting from a change
to the standard of proof when considering the balance of interests behind
that standard. In exchange for a patent, an applicant must disclose his
invention to society. 8 Just as the invention must meet certain requirements
to be worthy of receiving a patent, the associated patent protection must be

5

See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, a patent is presumed valid, and the one
attacking validity has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence.”); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) ("Neither does the standard of proof change; it must be by clear and
convincing evidence or its equivalent, by whatever form of words it may be expressed."
(citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934))).

6

See Brief for Google, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Microsoft,
131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290), 2011 WL 380826.

7

See Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2252.

8

See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (“As a
reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a
seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade
secret. But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to
enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has
expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to warn the industry
concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted.”).

2
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sufficient to incentivize disclosure by the applicant. 9 While the strength of
that protection is important, so is the reliability that a patent issued by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) will be upheld as
valid. 10 Since the current standard of proof gives deference to the PTO’s
decision to issue a valid patent, the standard increases the likelihood that a
patent’s validity will be upheld during litigation. 11 Lowering the standard
of proof to a preponderance of the evidence would remove the deference
given to the PTO, therefore making the enforceability of a patent suspect
until its validity is upheld in litigation. It makes sense for courts to give
the PTO deference when determining patent invalidity based on prior art
that the PTO has previously considered. 12 However, when patent validity
is challenged based on prior art that was not previously considered by the
PTO, giving deference to the PTO may make less sense.
[3]
In the case before the Supreme Court, the PTO had not previously
considered the new prior art. 13 Microsoft contended that before litigation,
i4i Limited Partnership (“i4i”) destroyed a computer software program
9

See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 3 (2008) (discussing the
patent system's creation of economic incentives to invent).

10

See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 978 (Ct. Cl.
1967) (“It is just as important that a good patent be ultimately upheld as that a bad one be
definitively stricken.”).

11

See generally J. Michael Buchanan, Deference Overcome: Courts’ Invalidation of
Patent Claims as Anticipated by Art Considered by the PTO, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
2, ¶ 1 (2006) (explaining that a patent's presumption of validity is partly based on the
patent examiner's consideration of prior art in granting the patent).
12

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (declaring that reviewing courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation
of ambiguous statutes). See generally Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An
Appeal For Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1181-86 (2008) (arguing for
Chevron deference to apply to patent claim construction, giving deference to the PTO
when interpreting claims).
13

See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2244 (2011).

3
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called “S4.” 14 According to Microsoft, this program would have rendered
i4i’s patent invalid if it had been available as prior art. 15 However,
Microsoft was unable to proffer the destroyed program and therefore could
not meet the clear and convincing standard. 16 The only remaining
evidence of the computer program was the testimony of a co-inventor of
S4, who was a former i4i employee. 17 The co-inventor testified about the
content and function of S4. 18 Microsoft also presented expert testimony
about how, based on the co-inventor’s testimony, S4 taught some of the
features of i4i’s U.S. Patent No. 5,787,449 (“the ‘449 patent”). 19
However, the sole testimony of an alleged co-inventor cannot meet the
clear and convincing evidence standard. 20 To successfully meet the
standard, according to Microsoft, Microsoft needed to corroborate the
alleged co-inventor’s testimony, but could not do so due to a lack of
corroborating evidence as S4 had been destroyed. 21 Microsoft contends

14

i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion
withdrawn and superseded on reh'g, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d 131 S. Ct. 2238
(2011).

15

See id.

16

Id. at 1263.

17

Id. at 1262.

18

Id. at 1262-63.

19

Id. at 1263. See generally U.S. Patent No. 5,787,449 (filed June 2, 1994) (illustrating
Microsoft's '449 patent).
20

Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 522 F.3d 1279, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

21

See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 847 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 647, 178 L. Ed. 2d 476 (U.S. 2010) and aff’d 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
Disagreeing with Microsoft, the Federal Circuit held that corroborating evidence, while
required to support testimony alone of any witness to invalidate a patent, was not
required in response to a claim for patent invalidity. See id.

4
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that a lower standard should apply to allow it to meet the burden of proof
in light of S4 being destroyed. 22
[4]
The unusual facts of the i4i case cause a change to the
preponderance of the evidence standard to seem appealing. However, bad
facts make for bad law. Lowering the standard to address those bad facts
would damage the patent system and stifle innovation.
[5]
First, this paper describes the interests behind the presumption of
patent validity and the historical treatment of the burden of proof required
to overcome that presumption. While precedent does not bind the
Supreme Court, it is important to consider how and why a particular
standard has been applied in addition to Congress’s inaction in
implementing a new standard. Second, this paper examines arguments in
support of maintaining the status quo, changing to a preponderance of the
evidence standard, and adopting a dual standard where some evidence
must rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence while other
evidence need only show invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence.
Finding this dual standard to be impractical, and the broad application of
the preponderance of the evidence standard to be inappropriate, this paper
supports the continued broad application of the clear and convincing
standard along with congressional action to address the unfairness that
accompanies broad application of that standard.
II.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STANDARD OF PROOF PROBLEM

[6]
The interests behind the presumption of patent validity provide
context for the standard of proof issue within the patent system. This
section analyzes those interests by examining the application of both the
clear and convincing standard and the preponderance of the evidence
standard in various circuit courts before the establishment of the Federal
Circuit, in the Federal Circuit itself, and the Supreme Court. The
historical treatment of the standard of proof reflects the standard’s

22

See i4i, 589 F.3d at 1263.

5
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purpose, which although merely persuasive, is significant in light of
Congress’s refusal to change the standard. 23
A. Interests Behind the Standard of Proof
[7]
Patents are obtained through an examination process performed by
the PTO. 24 First, an inventor submits an application to the PTO. Then, a
PTO examiner evaluates the patentability of the invention and eventually
allows a patent to issue or issues a rejection. 25 An issued patent is entitled
to a presumption of validity. 26 This presumption of validity can only be
overcome by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. 27
[8]
Several factors support this heightened standard. First, the PTO is
presumed to have thoroughly examined patent applications and to have
issued valid patents. 28 Second, the PTO is the agency that determines
patent validity, so its decisions should generally preside over a finding of
invalidity by a non-expert. 29 Third, the heightened standard facilitates
licensing, purchasing, and acquisition of patent rights by increasing the
23

See Kristen Dietly, Lightening the Load: Whether the Burden of Proof for Overcoming
a Patent’s Presumption of Validity Should be Lowered, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2615, 2651
(2010). The Court has not issued any opinions on the appropriate standard of proof to
overcome the presumption of patent validity that are binding on the Federal Circuit. See
id.

24

See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(1) (2010) (mandating that the PTO “shall adopt and use a seal of
the Office . . . with which letters patent[s] . . . shall be authenticated”).
25

35 U.S.C. §§ 131-132(a).

26

35 U.S.C. § 282.

27

See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
28

See 35 U.S.C. § 131; Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d at 1360.

29

See W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

6
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reliability of an issued patent’s validity. 30 However, applying a lower
standard that does not give deference to the PTO would promote
uncertainty in the enforceability of a patent until it is upheld as valid after
litigation.
[9]
However, a heightened standard for overcoming the presumption
of patent validity has aspects that make the first two factors suspect. PTO
examiners have limited time and resources, particularly due to the high
volume of incoming patent applications and the large backlog of
applications. 31 Further, PTO examiners are usually not capable of
evaluating all of the identified prior art references for reasons other than
time constraints. 32 Some prior art is unknown to both the examiner and
the inventor during examination. 33 In uncommon cases with bad facts,
parties may have, in good faith, destroyed relevant prior art before
litigation. 34

30

See Microsoft v. i4i Petitioner and Amici Briefs, OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND,
MAIER & NEUSTADT (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.oblon.com/blog/donna/2011/02/08/micr
osoft-v-I4i-petitioner-and-amici-briefs.
31

See Dietly, supra note 23, at 2655; Data Visualization Center, UNITED STATES PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited
Jan. 14, 2011) (as of December 2011, 6,652 PTO examiners examined 112,073
applications in the fiscal year, the backlog of applications waiting to receive a first office
action tallied 662,457).
32

See Dietly, supra note 23, at 2655 (arguing that examiners have “inadequate access to
prior art”).
33

See id. at 2643 ( “[T]he examiner’s search for prior art is guided by only what the
applicant discloses.”).

34

See, e.g., i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft, 598 F.3d 831, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2010) cert granted, 131 S.
Ct. 647 (2010), aff’d 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).

7

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
B.

Volume XVIII, Issue 2

Background of the Clear and Convincing Standard

[10] Historically, the two most common standards of proof used in civil
litigation have been applied to overcome the presumption of patent
validity. 35 The clear and convincing evidence standard requires a showing
that an event is “highly probable,” though it does not quite rise to the level
of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 36 Alternatively, the preponderance of the
evidence standard merely requires a showing by more than a fifty percent
chance. 37
[11] The clear and convincing standard has long been the established
precedent of the Federal Circuit for overcoming the presumption of
validity. 38 Before the establishment of the Federal Circuit, however,
differing standards were applied across the various courts of appeals. 39
While the decisions of those courts have no binding impact on the Federal
Circuit or Supreme Court, the reasoning for applying various standards
provides context for the Federal Circuit’s broad application of the clear
and convincing standard.

35

See Dietly, supra note 23, at 2636, 2640.

36

See Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing
Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)).

37

See Hodges v. Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 968 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
38

See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
39

Compare Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975) (adopting a
preponderance of the evidence standard), and Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275, 278
(2d Cir. 1969) (applying a preponderance of the evidence standard), with Hobbs v. U.S.
Atomic Energy Comm’n, 451 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying a clear and
convincing evidence standard), and Universal Marion Corp. v. Warner & Swasey Co.,
354 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1965) (applying a clear and convincing evidence standard).

8
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[12] Some circuit courts have applied a heightened burden of proof. 40
For example, the Ninth Circuit held that a patent’s presumption of validity
could only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 41 The Ninth
Circuit went on to state that the presumption of validity is based on the
“expertness of the Patent Office acting within a specific field . . . .” 42 The
Tenth Circuit also applied the clear and convincing evidence standard. 43
To overcome a patent’s presumption of validity, the Fifth Circuit required
a “quantum of proof” greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence. 44
The Fifth Circuit stated that the clear and convincing evidence standard
and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard both satisfy this extra
“quantum of proof.” 45 The Eighth Circuit required a showing of
“substantial evidence” to overcome the presumption of validity. 46 Later,
the Eighth Circuit characterized both substantial evidence and clear and
convincing evidence as comparably heavy burdens of proof. 47
[13] In contrast, some courts merely required a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence to overcome a patent’s presumption of
validity. 48 For example, the Second Circuit stated that the presumption of
validity did not have “independent evidentiary value” and could be
overcome by “a preponderance of the evidence.” 49 The Fourth Circuit
40
41

See, e.g., Moon v. Cabot Shops, Inc., 270 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1959).
Id.

42

Id.

43

Universal Marion Corp. v. Warner & Swasey Co., 354 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1965).

44

Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 451 F.2d 849, 856 (5th Cir. 1971).

45

Id.

46

L & A Prods., Inc. v. Britt Tech Corp., 365 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1966).

47

Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 795 n.17 (8th Cir. 1978).

48

See, e.g., Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1969).

49

Id.

9
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explicitly rejected an argument that a defendant must overcome a
presumption of validity beyond a reasonable doubt. 50 The Fourth Circuit
applied a preponderance of the evidence standard. 51
[14] Despite the lack of consensus among courts regarding which
standard should be applied to overcome the presumption of patent validity,
courts have applied the same standard in cases where a prior art reference
had not been previously considered by the PTO. 52 When dealing with
such cases, courts required no more than a mere preponderance of the
evidence and some removed the presumption of validity altogether. 53 In
explaining why the heightened standard was not appropriate in those
cases, the Fifth Circuit stated that the PTO’s expertise, which was the
reason behind affording deference in the first place, was irrelevant because
the agency had not considered the prior art. 54

50

Universal Inc. v. Kay Mfg. Corp., 301 F.2d 140, 148 (4th Cir. 1962).

51

Id.

52

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, Microsoft Corp. v. z4 Techs., Inc., No. 071243 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008), 2008 WL 877886 at *22. For further discussion, see Dietly,
supra note 23, at 2644.

53

See Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont’l Plastics of Okla., Inc., 708 F.2d 1554, 1558 (10th
Cir. 1983); Turzillo v. P & Z Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Futorian Mfg. Corp. v. Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc., 528 F.2d 941, 943 (1st Cir. 1976); Alcor
Aviation, Inc. v. Radair Inc., 527 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1975); U.S. Expansion Bolt Co.
v. Jordan Indus., 488 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1973); Ralston Purina Co. v. Gen. Foods
Corp., 442 F.2d 389, 390 (8th Cir. 1971); Eisele v. St. Amour, 423 F.2d 135, 138-39 (6th
Cir. 1970); Formal Fashions, Inc. v. Braiman Bows, Inc., 369 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir.
1966); Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. McDowell Co., 317 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir. 1963).

54

See Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with this reasoning. See Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 679
F.2d 1355, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982).

10
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[15] When the Federal Circuit was established in 1982, it chose not to
adopt a standard of proof from any particular circuit. 55 Instead, the
Federal Circuit adopted the law of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the U.S. Court of Claims as precedent in its first decision. 56
Historically, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals required a showing
of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of patent
validity, regardless of whether the evidence had been previously
considered by the PTO. 57 In its first year, however, the Federal Circuit
declined to adopt a “particular standard of proof [as] necessary to reach a
legal conclusion,” holding that standards of proof “relate[] to specific
factual questions.” 58 The court expanded upon its position in 1983, stating
that while a standard of proof “relates [not] to legal presumptions, but to
facts,” a party seeking to overcome the presumption of validity must do so
by a showing of “clear and convincing evidence.” 59 In 1984, the Federal
Circuit concluded that prior art not considered by the PTO did not face a
different presumption or burden of proof than previously considered prior
art. 60 The court required a showing of clear and convincing evidence in
all cases to overcome a patent’s presumption of validity. 61 The Federal
Circuit did not clarify why it applied the clear and convincing standard so
broadly. 62 The court continued to broadly apply the clear and convincing
standard to patent invalidity challenges. 63
55

S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).

56

Id.

57

See Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 632 (C.C.P.A.
1978). For further discussion, see Dietly, supra note 23, at 2648-49.

58

SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

59

Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

60

Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934)).
61

Id. at 1360.

62

See id. at 1359-60.

11
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[16] In contrast to the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has not
definitively identified a particular standard of proof. 64 Before the i4i case,
the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the burden of proof required
to overcome the presumption of patent validity. 65 However, in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Court noted, in dicta, that when the
PTO had not considered prior art, the justification for applying a
heightened standard based on the PTO’s expertise is largely eliminated. 66
The i4i case gave the Court an opportunity to resolve the controversy
surrounding the appropriate standard of proof necessary to overcome the
presumption of patent validity.
III.

MICROSOFT CORP. V. I4I LTD. PARTNERSHIP

[17] i4i owns the '449 patent, 67 which claims a novel way of “editing
custom XML, a computer language.” 68
i4i sued Microsoft for

63

See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that in challenges to patent validity, the party “attacking validity
has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence”). There is at least
one instance where the court applied a lower standard for a validity issue. B. D. Daniel,
Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA
Q.J. 369, 394 n.136 (2008) (citing Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261,
1266 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the correct standard of proof of priority in invention
for co-pending patents is by a preponderance of the evidence).
64

Dietly, supra note 23, at 2651.

65

The Supreme Court addressed the standard of proof for determining inventorship, but
this determination is distinct from the determination of patent invalidity. Radio Corp. of
Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1934).
66

550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007).

67

Method and Sys. for Manipulating the Architecture and the Content of a Document
Separately from Each Other, U.S. Patent No. 5,787,449 (filed June 2, 1994) (issued July
28, 1998).

12
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infringement of the '449 patent, citing use of the claimed invention in
certain versions of Microsoft Word. 69
[18] In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas, a jury concluded that the '449 patent was not invalid and that the
patent was infringed by Microsoft. 70 The district court stated that
Microsoft bore the high burden of proving patent invalidity by a showing
of “clear and convincing evidence,” which the jury found Microsoft had
failed to meet. 71 The Federal Circuit affirmed the findings of the district
court. 72 Before the district court, Microsoft argued that the '449 patent
was invalid because it was anticipated by the sale of a program known as
S4. 73 S4 was developed and sold by i4i early enough to trigger the on-sale
bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 74 However, i4i destroyed S4 in good faith
before litigation and the PTO never considered it. 75 Because there was no
dispute that S4 is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the argument focused
68

i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S.
Ct. 2238 (2011). Specifically, the invention separates tags, referred to as “metacodes,”
from the content within computer code. Id. Separation of the metacodes from the
content of a document or webpage allows for a user to change the language of the content
without editing the metacodes, and to view the content as one document. Id. at 840. The
separated metacode and content documents can be independently edited and then put
back together via a “metacode map.” Id.
69

Id. at 839.

70

i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 573 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd as
modified, 589 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g,
598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
71

Id. at 584, 608.

72

i4i Ltd. P'ship, 598 F.3d at 864.

73

Id. at 846-47.

74

Id. at 846.

75

Id.

13
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on whether Microsoft adequately proved that S4 employed the “metacode
map” limitation claimed in the '449 patent. 76 Since S4 was destroyed,
corroborating testimony of S4’s creators with independent evidence
became a large issue. 77
[19] Microsoft presented testimony of a co-inventor, a former i4i
employee, because it lacked other evidence of S4’s coding and
capabilities. 78 Microsoft did not have evidence to corroborate the alleged
co-inventor’s testimony. 79 Microsoft contended that if i4i had not
destroyed S4 before litigation, it could have presented the corroborating
evidence required to meet this heightened standard. 80 Microsoft did not
corroborate the alleged co-inventor’s testimony and could not meet the
clear and convincing standard. 81
[20] Microsoft argued that the district court erred in its application of
the clear and convincing standard and stated that the burden of proof
should have been a preponderance of the evidence. 82 When the Federal
76

Id. at 846-47.

77

See i4i Ltd. P'ship, 598 F.3d at 846-47.

78

See id. at 847-48.

79

Id.

80

i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion
withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct.
2238 (2011).

81

See i4i Ltd. P'ship, 598 F.3d at 848; cf. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc.,
522 F.3d 1279, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Although Microsoft contends that it needed
corroborating evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard, the Federal Circuit
disagreed. The court held that corroborating evidence, while required to support
testimony alone of any witness to invalidate a patent, was not required in response to a
claim for patent invalidity. See i4i Ltd. P'ship, 598 F.3d at 847.

82

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12-13, i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d 831 (No. 10-290),
2010 WL 3413088 at *14-15.
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to apply the clear and
convincing standard, Microsoft petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari. 83
[21] At the Supreme Court, Microsoft continued to argue that the Patent
Act did not support the clear and convincing standard. 84 Countering
Microsoft’s argument, i4i cited Congress’ refusal to change the standard
and the need to defer to the expertise of the PTO. 85 The Supreme Court
decided to maintain the broad application of the clear and convincing
standard. 86 However, the Court’s reasoning to arrive at that conclusion is
suspect. Section III explores the analysis that the Court should have made.
IV.
THREE SCENARIOS TO CONSIDER WHEN DETERMINING
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR BROAD APPLICATION
[22] When determining which standard of proof for overcoming a
patent’s presumption of validity is appropriate for broad application,
separating the analysis into three types of scenarios provides clarity. First,
the clear and convincing evidence standard should apply when the PTO
has previously considered the prior art reference in question. Second, the
clear and convincing evidence standard should also apply when prior the
PTO does not previously consider prior art references in question and
some post-grant review is available for consideration. Third, the
preponderance of the evidence standard is fairer when the PTO did not
previously consider the prior art reference in question and some post-grant
review to consider this art is unavailable.

83

See generally i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d at 864; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, i4i Ltd.
P’ship, 598 F.3d 831 (No. 10-290).
84

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2247-48 (2011).

85

Id. at 2252.

86

Id.
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A. Previously Considered Prior Art
[23] In litigation where the alleged infringer asserts patent invalidity
based on evidence that was previously reviewed by a PTO examiner, a
showing of clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate standard of
proof for overcoming a patent’s presumption of validity. 87 As the expert
agency in determining patent validity, the PTO’s decisions should be
given deference. 88 Expert agencies are awarded deference for other
determinations, such as statutory interpretation under Chevron. 89 Also,
business transactions, such as licensing, purchasing, and acquisition of
patent rights, rely heavily on the strong presumption of an issued patent’s
validity that accompanies the clear and convincing standard. 90 Without
the heightened standard of proof, the enforceability of a patent would
remain questionable until litigation. 91 Under a lower standard, those
business transactions would be largely disrupted. 92 In this scenario,
87

See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Lab., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934); Price v.
Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

88

See W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining
that a patent examiner’s decisions are given presumptive correctness because he is a
“quasi-judicial official”).
89

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (declaring that reviewing courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation
of ambiguous statutes); Chen, supra note 12, at 1181-86 (2008) (arguing for Chevron
deference to apply to patent claim construction, giving deference to the PTO when
interpreting claims).
90

Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 15-16, Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290), 2011 WL 343072 at
*15-16.
91

See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of
Validity, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 45, 52, 58 (2007).

92

See Microsoft v. i4i Petitioner and Amici Briefs, OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND,
MAIER & NEUSTADT (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.oblon.com/blog/donna/2
011/02/08/microsoft-v-i4i-petitioner-and-amici-briefs.
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arguments center on awarding Chevron deference, the constitutional basis
for applying a standard other than the default preponderance of the
evidence standard for civil cases, and public policy. 93 As the expert
agency, the PTO should be trusted to do its job. 94 Expert findings have
appropriately been given special treatment in other areas. 95
[24] Although different than determinations of patent validity, Chevron
deference is awarded to expert agencies for statutory interpretation. 96
Chevron deference bases judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations upon “a range of reasonable interpretations, rather than a
single prescriptive meaning.” 97 When applying Chevron deference, a
reviewing court applies a two-step analysis. 98 First, the court looks to
whether the plain language of a statute is ambiguous. 99 If the statute is
unambiguous, the court should apply the unambiguous meaning as
directed by Congress. 100 Second, if the statute is ambiguous, the court
examines whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable. 101 If an
93

See Chen, supra note 12, at 1185-86.

94

Moon v. Cabot Shops, Inc., 270 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1959) (supporting this notion);
see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007) (noting that in cases
where the PTO had not considered prior art, the justification for the application of a
heightened standard on the basis of the PTO’s expertise is largely eliminated).
95

See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (declaring that reviewing courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation
of ambiguous statutes).
96

See id.

97

Chen, supra note 12, at 1181.

98

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.

99

Id. at 842-43.

100

Id.

101

Id.
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agency defines an ambiguous statutory term in a reasonable way, the
reviewing court must uphold the agency’s interpretation. 102 It is
reasonable to apply Chevron deference to other areas as well for reasons
such as the access to experts and other resources, maintaining the
separation of power between branches of government, “improv[ing] the
quality of agency proceedings . . . and encourag[ing] clearer
draftsmanship.” 103
[25] For the same reasons 104, deference to the PTO should be given in
the i4i v. Microsoft case. First, the PTO certainly has more expertise than
the courts in evaluating prior art and determining patent validity. 105
Regardless of a particular examiner’s technical background, the expertise
of the PTO resides in the authority vested in an examiner’s
appointment. 106 Second, applying Chevron deference in this situation
maintains a separation between the judiciary and executive branch by
preventing courts from interfering with “administrative agencies’
policymaking responsibilities.” 107 The PTO is the designated agency for
determining patentability and issuing patents. 108 Congress did not direct

102

See id.; Chen, supra note 12, at 1182.

103

Chen, supra note 12, at 1181–85 (2008).

104

Id.

105

Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 316 (2007).

106

See W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 433 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“Furthermore, questions that might discredit an examiner are irrelevant because it is not
the particular examiner’s expertise that gives the decisions presumptive correctness but
the authority duly vested in him by his appointment as a patent examiner.”).
107

Chen, supra note 12, at 1183.

108

35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006).
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that role to the judiciary. 109 As such, the PTO should fulfill its role as the
primary issuer of patents while the courts should enforce issued patents.
[26] Though they carry little weight, there are four reasons why the
PTO’s decisions of patent validity are not a traditional fit for receiving
Chevron deference. First, the PTO does not generally engage in either
informal rulemaking or formal adjudication, which are two proceedings
that merit deference. 110 While engaging in those proceedings would
strengthen the argument for receiving Chevron deference, a failure to do
so does not foreclose it.111 Second, examiners are usually hired for their
technical training rather than legal training. 112 While not all agencies are
comprised of legal experts, PTO examiners’ lack of formal legal training
guides against granting deference. 113 However, Congress has directed the
PTO to have the primary role for determining patent validity. 114 To fulfill

109
110

111

See id.
Chen, supra note 12, at 1189 (quoting Benjamin & Rai, supra note 105, at 297).
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 105, at 298.

112

See Patent Examiner Positions - View Jobs, UNITED STATES PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., http://www.usptocareers.gov/Pages/PEPositions/Jobs.aspx (last visited Nov. 18,
2011) (“Basic qualifications for Patent Examiners include United States citizenship and a
minimum of a bachelor’s degree in physical sciences, life science, engineering discipline
or computer science.”).
113

Chen, supra note 12, at 1189; cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman
II), 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“The construction of written instruments is one of those
things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training
in exegesis.”). However, it is important to consider that agencies need not be comprised
of legal experts. See e.g., Opportunities for College and Grad School Graduates,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/careers/gra
dopp.html#college (last visited, Nov. 30, 2011) (“The ECP seeks graduates with a
bachelor’s or higher level degree in a variety of academic disciplines, including physical
and life sciences, business, finance, computer sciences, policy and public
administration”).
114

35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006).
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that role, PTO examiners are not required to have legal expertise.115
Rather, examiners require technical skills to understand and differentiate
inventions from the prior art. 116 Third, PTO determinations of patent
validity are often made based on incomplete information such as missing
prior art. 117 In this scenario, however, this reason is irrelevant because the
PTO made an informed decision based on prior art that it reviewed. 118
Finally, deference may not be appropriate because PTO proceedings are
generally ex parte in nature. 119
[27] Although PTO proceedings are generally ex parte in nature,
examiners are neutral in their analysis of patent validity as mandated by
the PTO. 120 Examiners are trained to analyze prior art and issue rejections
if necessary. 121 Also, patents are usually issued after receiving at least one
rejection. 122 Since the PTO has been given the role of the primary issuer
115

See Patent Examiner Positions, supra note 112.

116

See General Requirements Bulletin for Admission to the Examination for Registration
to Practice in Patent Cases Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
UNITED STATES PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., (Feb., 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards
/oed/grb.pdf.
117

Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that
there is nearly always “pertinent” and “relevant” prior art that is unconsidered by the
PTO).
118

i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion
withdrawn and superseded on reh'g, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238
(2011).
119

Chen, supra note 12, at 1190.

120

See id. at 1168, 1190.

121

Patent Examiner Training, UNITED STATES PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2004/0602_patexamtrain.jsp (last modified July
4, 2009, 1:22 PM).

122

Christopher A. Cotropia et. al, Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for
the Presumption of Validity 11, (Stanford Law and Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 401,
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of patents and because it has the capacity to fulfill this role, especially
when it has previously considered the prior art in question, the PTO’s
decision to issue a patent should be given deference by the courts. While
the PTO’s decisions of patent validity may not fit the traditional mold to
receive Chevron deference, these factors are unconvincing to prevent
receiving such deference.
[28] Another argument against applying the clear and convincing
standard is Congress’ failure to address whether a heightened standard of
proof should apply. In civil suits, the party bearing the burden of proof
may overcome that burden by a preponderance of the evidence, unless
important liberty interests are at stake or Congress has heightened the
standard. 123 Congress specified the presumption of validity, but was silent
as to the standard of proof for overcoming that presumption. 124 However,
stating that there is a presumption of patent validity only to set the burden
at the default preponderance of the evidence standard would be
superfluous. Arguably, the presumption was only identified because the
burden of proof changed. Furthermore, Congress has had many
opportunities to change the Federal Circuit’s broad application of the clear
and convincing standard, but has failed to do so. 125
[29] The next argument turns on public policy. Microsoft and several
others contended that applying the heightened clear and convincing
standard stifles innovation because it provides too much protection for
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568 (“Applicants submitted 23,664 of
the 32,180 prior art references cited in patents with at least one prior art-based rejection,
or 73.5%.”).
123

See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).

124

See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2010) (identifying who bears the burden of proof on invalidity,
but saying nothing about the evidentiary standard for meeting that burden of proof).
125

See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2010) (identifying who bears the burden of proof on
invalidity, but saying nothing about changing the evidentiary standard for meeting that
burden of proof).
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invalid patents and simultaneously lowers patent quality. 126 If the PTO
incorrectly issues a patent, the heightened standard of proof makes it more
difficult to prove that the patent is invalid. Proponents of this argument
contend that the issuance of invalid patents is a major problem, and cite a
lack of full knowledge of the prior art, time, and resources among PTO
examiners as reasons why the PTO issues invalid patents. 127 However,
these public policy concerns are unpersuasive when considering the patent
system as a whole.
[30] Lowering the standard to preponderance of the evidence and taking
away the deference given to PTO decisions on patent validity will not
promote patent quality. 128 In fact, taking away the deference given to the
PTO would effectively shift the task of ultimately determining patent
validity from the PTO to the courts. 129 With this lower standard, alleged
infringers would probably challenge the validity of patents more
frequently because courts could disregard the PTO’s validity decision. 130
The PTO would only serve as an initial filter to patentability, and validity
would remain suspect until upheld by a court. Such a system would
126

See Taylor, supra note 118, at 312-313.

127

See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro,
Intellectual Property, Competition, and Information Technology 31-33 (UC Berkeley
Competition Policy Ctr., Working Paper No. CPC04-45, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=527782.
128

Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 13.
129

Michael J. Shuster et. al, Altering Patent Suit Proof Burden Would Chill Innovation,19
WASH. LEGAL FOUND., no. 7, 2004, at 4, available at http://www.fenwick.com
/docstore/477/Altering_Patent.pdf; Biotechnology Indus. Org., Response to the Federal
Trade Commission’s Patent System Reform Recommendations, 4 (Apr. 26, 2004),
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/ResponsetoFTCPatReformrecommendations.pdf.
130

See Stephen E. Noona, U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Challenge to Burden of
Proof Standard for Invalidity, INSIDE BUS.: THE HAMPTON ROADS BUS. J., (Dec. 7 2010),
http://www.insidebiz.com/blogs/kaufman-canoles/us-supreme-court-agreeshearchallengeburden-proof-standard-invalidity.
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provide little incentive to improve the quality of patent examination
because the quality of that examination would not influence the likelihood
of a patent being held valid in court. 131 Instead of increasing innovation,
lowering to the preponderance of the evidence standard may ultimately
lead to lower patent quality, greater uncertainty of patent rights, and
increased litigation. 132
[31] There is also a significant reliance on issued patents being upheld
as valid. 133 Reliance on the current standard of proof for business
decisions makes the prospect of changing the standard of proof disturbing
for the stability of the entire patent system. 134 Businesses have made
strategic decisions about licensing rates and whether “to bring, defer,
pursue, or settle infringement lawsuits” based on the clear and convincing
standard. 135 In essence, investments in companies are based on the
heightened standard. 136 Clients decide whether to launch new product
lines by relying on legal opinions of patent attorneys who based their
opinions on that heightened standard. 137 Changing the standard of proof
131

See Etan S. Chatlynne, Note, The Burden of Establishing Patent Invalidity:
Maintaining a Heightened Evidentiary Standard Despite Increasing “Verbal Variances”,
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 297, 320 (2009) (stating that lowering to a preponderance of the
evidence standard to overcome patent invalidity would weaken patents and increase
associated litigation).
132

See id.

133

See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents, 1 CAPITALISM
& SOC’Y, Issue 3, Art. 3, at 22 (2006) (“Uncertainty is the enemy of investment . . .
[E]liminating the presumption of validity is [thus] a potentially dangers change in terms
of . . . innovation.”); see also Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
134

See Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 133, at 51.

135

Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 15.
136

Id.

137

Id.
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for overcoming patent validity disrupts the foundation on which these
decisions were made and would significantly disrupt the U.S. economy. 138
The heightened burden increases the incentive for inventors to engage in
substantial research and development and to disclose their inventions in
pursuit of patents rather than keep their innovations hidden as trade
secrets. 139 In situations where the PTO has previously considered the
prior art in question, the clear and convincing standard should apply.
B. Prior Art Not Previously Considered Where
PTO Reexamination Is an Option
[32] In litigation where the alleged infringer asserts patent invalidity
based on evidence that was not reviewed by a PTO examiner, but that
could have been the basis for a reexamination proceeding, the clear and
convincing evidence remains the appropriate standard. Applying the
heightened standard encourages the use of reexamination proceedings
while allowing parties to choose to litigate. 140 Congress created
reexamination proceedings as a cheaper and more efficient alternative to
litigation. 141 Courts should allow the means provided by Congress to
serve their intended purpose.

138

See, e.g., AIPLA Response to the October 2003 Federal Trade Commission Report,
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N 6 (Apr. 21, 2004), http://www.
aipla.org/advocacy/executive/Documents/ResponseToFTC.pdf; Biotechnology Indus.
Org., supra note 129, at 4–5 (estimating the potential effect of lowering the standard on
the biotechnology industry).
139

Richard S. Gruner, Better Living Through Software: Promoting Information
Processing Advances Through Patent Incentives, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 977, 1012-13
(2000).
140

See Alan W. Kowalchyk & Joshua P. Graham, Patent Reexamination: An Effective
Litigation Alternative?, 3 LANDSLIDE, no. 1, 2010 at 2, available at
http://www.merchantgould.com/CM/Articles/Kowalchyk_LANDSL IDE.pdf.
141

See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4 (1980) (predicting that reexamination would
require “a fraction of the time” of litigation).
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[33] A reexamination proceeding allows the PTO to reevaluate new
evidence that raises a substantial new question of patent validity. 142
Congress created the reexamination proceedings to act as a faster and
more cost efficient alternative to litigation. 143 There are several factors
that make it a preferred option, including timing, the applicable standard
of proof, the ability to amend claims, and reliance on an expert agency. 144
[34] First, the timing with which reexamination may be brought
forward is flexible. 145 Reexamination can be requested by anyone at any
time. 146
Judges retain discretion over delaying litigation until a
reexamination proceeding concludes. 147 Their discretionary power should
not be used suspend litigation for a party who is simply seeking to delay
litigation proceedings, or after the parties have invested significant time
and resources into the litigation. However, a party seeking to use
reexamination proceedings instead of litigation should be allowed to do
so, and even incentivized to do so, so long as they file a request for
reexamination in a timely manner.

142

R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 16:71 (4th ed.).

143

See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, supra note 141.

144

Cf. id. at 3.

145

35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).

146

Id.

147

See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (W.D.N.Y. 1999),
appeal dismissed, 243 F.3d 554 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In determining whether to delay
litigation, courts consider whether the associated delay “would unduly prejudice” the
party not requesting the delay, whether the delay will “simplify the issues in question and
trial of the case,” and whether “discovery is complete and whether the trial date has been
set.” Id. at 406-07. The closer to trial, the less likely a delay for reexamination will be
granted. Id. at 407. If a trial date is already set, a requesting party must generally show a
“clear case of hardship or inequity” to delay the trial. Id. at 407.
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[35] Second, reexamination proceedings apply the preponderance of the
evidence standard. 148 Therefore, parties have the option of meeting the
heightened burden within the courts or the preponderance of the evidence
standard in a reexamination proceeding. 149 If courts applied the
preponderance of the evidence standard, there would be no point in having
reexamination proceedings because deference would not be given to PTO
decisions as discussed in the previous subsection. Third, reexamination
allows for invalid claims to be narrowed, if appropriate, rather than to be
completely destroyed as required by litigation. 150 Because a claim can be
narrowed, the PTO has more discretion to reward innovation and
invalidate protection for non-innovation. Fourth, reexamination directs
decisions of patentability to the PTO. 151 Congress designated the PTO as
the expert agency to serve as the primary issuer of patents. 152 Because of
these distinctions, reexamination should be preferred over litigation for
those wishing to challenge patent validity.
[36] Reexamination is not without its faults. It takes time, usually two
to three years on average. 153 Additionally, the patent holder may file an
appeal with the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, thereby adding
another two to three years on average, followed by the possibility of an

148

See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re Caveney, 761
F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
149

Id.

150

35 U.S.C. § 305 (2006).

151

See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1374.

152

See 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006); discussion supra Part III(a).

153

See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION
FILING DATA (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/EP_quarterly_report
_June_2011.pdf; UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES
REEXAMINATION FILING DATA (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/pat
ents/IP_quarterly_report_June_2011.pdf.
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appeal to the Federal Circuit. 154 However, litigation takes time too.
Congress created the reexamination proceedings to provide a more
efficient alternative to costly and lengthy litigation. 155 As such, a clear
and convincing evidence standard should be applied when reexamination
is available. Different arguments are applicable for other types of prior
art, which do not allow for reexamination.
C. Prior Art Not Previously Considered Where
PTO Reexamination is Not an Option
[37] In litigation, where the alleged infringer asserts patent invalidity
based on evidence that was not reviewed by a PTO examiner, and could
not have been the basis for a reexamination proceeding, the preponderance
of the evidence standard is fairer than the clear and convincing standard.
In this scenario, applying the clear and convincing standard gives
deference to decisions that the PTO did not make because the prior art
reference in question was not considered before the patent was granted
and could not be considered post-issuance. Applying this heightened
standard leads to circumstances where a party challenging patent validity
is unable to meet the heightened standard through no fault of its own, as
was the case in Microsoft. 156
[38] Unlike the other two scenarios, public policy does not support a
heightened standard here. There is less reason to give such deference to
the PTO when it had not, and could not, evaluate the new prior art. 157 In
this scenario, reexamination is not available, therefore litigation is the only
154

See 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2006); Brad Pedersen, Polishing a Diamond in the Rough:
Suggestions for Improving Inter Partes Reexaminations, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 422, 422 n.3 (2009).
155

See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, supra note 141.

156

See generally Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).

157

See id. at 2251 (“Simply put, if the PTO did not have all material facts before it, its
considered judgment may lost significant force.”).
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avenue to overturn the PTO’s decision because Congress has provided no
alternatives. 158 Consequently, when the PTO is unavailable, no expert
agency is better suited to evaluate a patent’s validity than the court.159
These reasons, while compelling, are not sufficient to warrant the broad
application of the preponderance of the evidence standard.
[39] While Microsoft could not meet the heightened standard because
the S4 program had been destroyed prior to litigation, this is an
uncommon circumstance. 160 In many cases, when prior art has been
destroyed, courts will look for inequitable conduct or litigation
misconduct. 161 When prior art has not been destroyed, corroborative
evidence is, or should be, available. A broad change in the standard of
proof to overcome patent invalidity, solely based on bad facts of an
uncommon situation, as in the Microsoft case, would cause more harm
than good in the patent system by upsetting the balance of interests in
more common situations.
[40] For the above reasons, broad application of the clear and
convincing standard is appropriate in most cases, but fails to provide
adequate opportunity alleged infringers to defend themselves in situations
where reexamination by the PTO is unavailable under the Patent Act.

158

See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (showing the lack of alternatives to litigation).

159

Cf. Dickenson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999).

160

See generally i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh'g, 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S.
Ct. 2238 (2011).
161

See e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Mobil Oil Corp, No. H-96-3795, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17555, at *66-82 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 1998) (highlighting the requirements of an
inequitable conduct defense).
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THE DUAL STANDARD, WHILE THE MOST FAIR STANDARD,
IS IMPRACTICAL

[41] A dual standard provides a more equitable solution than either the
preponderance of the evidence standard or the clear and convincing
evidence standard alone. The dual standard would apply a preponderance
of the evidence standard when dealing with new prior art that is not
eligible for reexamination. The clear and convincing evidence standard
would serve as the burden of proof to overcome prior art previously
considered by the PTO as well as new prior art that is eligible for
reexamination. The dual standard would be the fairest way to address the
various scenarios previously discussed. However, the dual standard would
be impractical for three reasons. First, requiring jurors to keep track of
two standards regarding prior art would cause confusion and make the two
standards ineffective. 162 Second, litigation would inappropriately hinge on
whether a particular prior art reference was “considered” by the PTO,
which raises additional concerns about how to appropriately define
“considered.” 163 Finally, the dual standard might overwhelm the PTO by
incentivizing a flood of prior art from applicants. 164 As a result, a dual
standard should not be adopted.
[42] First, the dual standard, though fairer than either standard alone,
would likely confuse jurors. 165 Patent cases are already difficult for juries
to understand based on the complex nature of the cases themselves. 166

162

Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 21.
163

Id. at 20.

164

Id. at 22.

165

Id. at 21.

166

Mary M. Calkins et al., Bearing Witness: Court-Appointed Experts in Patent Cases,
LAW TECH. NEWS (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/P
ubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202443308577&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; see, e.g., Comaper
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Jurors struggle to keep track of multiple standards in patent cases. 167 For
instance, the clear and convincing evidence standard is applicable to
showing patent invalidity, whereas the preponderance of the evidence
standard is applicable for determining whether infringement occurred. 168
Varying standards of proof for a single determination are also difficult for
jurors to define and quantify. 169 Adding yet another standard of proof to
address patent invalidity based on certain prior art will only increase juror
confusion. If the two standards were blurred together due to confusion,
some of the deference given to the PTO may be taken away or
magnified. 170 For these reasons, jury confusion would likely make the
dual standard impractical.
[43] Second, the dual standard also focuses the litigation away from the
differences between the prior art and the invention. Rather, the focus
becomes directed at whether the PTO examiner has previously evaluated
the prior art, in addition to whether the prior art is eligible for
reexamination. This shift in focus will likely increase the time and cost of

Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (vacating the lower court’s
decision because the jury’s verdicts represented an “irreconcilable inconsistency”).
167

Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 21 (stating that infringement issues are evaluated using a
preponderance of the evidence standard while patent validity employs a clear and
convincing evidence standard).
168

Id.

169

See Jane Goodman, Jurors’ Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic
Evidence, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361, 364-66 (1992-1993) (providing an extensive
discussion on the difficulty that jurors have quantifying the different standards of proof in
probabilistic quantities).
170

See Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10290), 2011 WL 1059617 at *5.
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litigation. 171 Furthermore, determining what constitutes “considered”
prior art presents new issues of its own. 172
[44] Prior art is referenced throughout a patent’s examination. 173 An
applicant discloses some prior art references in an Information Disclosure
Statement. 174 Depending on the number of references included in the
Information Disclosure Statement, a PTO examiner may be unable to
realistically “consider” them all. 175 PTO examiners also find and consider
prior art references during patent examination. 176 As an application goes
through an examination, the examiner discusses some prior art references
at length while others are merely mentioned. 177 Also, an examiner will
have certain background knowledge or be aware of pertinent teachings

171

See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72,
96-97 (1983) (stating that the more complex a lawsuit is, the more time and cost will be
involved in litigation).
172

See Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 633 n.9 (C.C.P.A.
1978) (“It has been pointed out that a mere failure to cite certain prior art does not
necessarily mean it was no considered by the examiner, who may have considered it
unworthy of citation.”).
173

See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2011); M.P.E.P. § 707.05.

174

See M.P.E.P. § 704.12(a) (2006); M.P.E.P. § 704.14(d) (2006); PTO Form 1449.

175

See H.R. Rep. No. 107-120 at 2 (2001) (“It has also lead to abuse by patent agents
and lawyers who are gaming the system . . . [by] include[ing] hundreds of prior art
references, knowing that the PTO examiner has only a few precious hours to review the
application before she is required to make a decision on its grant.”). See generally Fiscal
Year 2010 USPTO Workload Tables, available at http://www.uspto.gov
/about/stratplan/ar/2010/oai_0 6_wlt_00.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
176

See M.P.E.P. § 1302.12 (2006); PTO Form 892.

177

Brief of Amicus Curiae for International Business Machines Corporation in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 88, at 19.
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from prior art that may be “considered” but not listed as prior art on any
form during patent examination. 178
[45] Even if all listed prior art is deemed “considered” for these
purposes, it is still difficult to determine how thoroughly the examiner
read, evaluated, and applied a particular reference. 179 Each action by an
examiner would have to be adequately defined and quantified. As an
examiner goes through examination, each action would have to be taken
and documented, presumably slowing productivity. Addressing issues as
to the thoroughness of an examination may also complicate and delay
litigation. Further, PTO examiners would not be particularly helpful
during litigation to resolve the issue because they cannot be compelled to
disclose their “mental processes” at trial regarding a decision on a patent
application. 180 The issues raised in determining whether a prior art
reference has been “considered” make the impracticality of a dual standard
more apparent.
[46] Third, adopting a dual standard may overly encourage applicants to
flood the PTO with prior art references. 181 The current system requires an
applicant to disclose relevant prior art of which the applicant is aware. 182
178

See id.; cf. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(noting that there is almost always “pertinent” and “relevant” prior art that is apparently
unconsidered by the PTO).
179

Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 19-20.
180

See, e.g., id. at 20 (citing W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 431 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (stating that as a general rule, a “patent examiner cannot be compelled to
testify regarding his ‘mental processes.’”).
181

See Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party, supra note 90, at 22; Brief for Genentech, Inc. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 27-28, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238
(2011) (No. 10-290), 2011 WL 994261.
182

See Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348,
1351 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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While an applicant must disclose relevant prior art, there is no obligation
and limited incentive to extensively search for prior art or to submit
irrelevant prior art to the PTO. 183 However, patent applicants would want
the clear and convincing standard to be applied and a dual standard would
encourage them to disclose as much prior art as possible to the PTO. 184
Increased disclosure of prior art to the PTO is not necessarily bad.
However, extensive disclosure of irrelevant prior art references would be
distracting and wasteful of the PTO’s already limited resources. 185
[47] There are two possible solutions to turn this from a potentially
negative factor into a positive factor. First, placing a limit on the total
number of prior art references that a patent applicant can submit would
improve the quality of the submitted references. The limit should be
based on the invention’s area of technology and include other factors such
as foreign filing. It is crucial that a limit be set that appreciates increased
disclosure of prior art while deterring extensive disclosure of irrelevant
prior art. By limiting the number of references that an applicant can
submit, there is an incentive to submit the most on-point references over
irrelevant prior art. Second, adding a fee per reference will help alleviate
the additional burden placed on the PTO to keep up with the flood of
references. Essentially, an applicant would be paying for an examiner’s
time to sift through all of the disclosed prior art references. As certain
patents may be worth paying a high amount to list hundreds of prior art
references, these two solutions preferably operate together. With
applicants submitting increased relevant prior art and PTO examiners
having additional resources, a potentially negative factor could result in
higher quality patent examination.

183

Id.

184

Brief for International Business Machines Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 90, at 22.
185

See H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 2 (2001) (stating that there was abuse by patent agents
and attorneys who include an overwhelming number of prior art references in their
applications knowing that the PTO examiner cannot consider all of them).
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[48] Based on the resulting juror confusion, inappropriate focus on
whether prior art has been “considered,” and flooding of prior art sent to
the PTO, applying a dual standard is not practical. While it is the fairest
balance of interests, a broad application of the clear and convincing
evidence standard coupled with congressional changes over what qualifies
for PTO reexamination is a more practical solution.
VI.

THE SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY MAINTAINED THE
STATUS QUO, BUT RE-OPENED THE DOOR FOR CONCERN
WITH JURY INSTRUCTIONS

[49] The Supreme Court correctly affirmed the broad application of the
clear and convincing standard; however, it opened the door to a dual
standard based on its jury instruction. 186 In support of its decision, the
Court addressed Microsoft’s two main arguments. 187 First, Microsoft
contended that the clear and convincing standard has no congressional
authority because Congress did not specify it in the Patent Act and there
are no significant liberty interests involved. 188 Second, Microsoft argued
that the preponderance of the evidence standard should be applicable
where the prior art in question was not before the PTO during the
examination process. 189
[50] The Supreme Court held that there was congressional authority for
the clear and convincing standard. 190 In reaching that conclusion, the

186

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011).

187

See generally id. at 2244.

188

See Brief for Petitioner, Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290), 2011 WL 288890 at
*8; see also Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2244-45.

189

Id. at 2244.

190

See id. at 2244-49.
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Court looked to § 282 of the Patent Act of 1952. 191 While it did not
explicitly state the clear and convincing standard of proof, § 282 featured
distinctive common law terms, including the term “presumed valid.”192
Without express direction from Congress, those terms retain their common
law meaning. 193 Citing Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering
Laboratories, Inc., where the Court implemented a high standard for
determining inventorship, the Court found that the clear and convincing
standard had been long established in the common law for determining
questions of patent validity. 194 For purposes of identifying the standard of
proof, the Supreme Court did not distinguish between determining
inventorship and questions of patent invalidity. 195
191

See generally Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (2011) (describing § 282 of the Patent
Act of 1952).
192

Id. at 2245 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58 (2007)).

193

Id.

194

Id. at 2245-46 (citing Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 2, 7-8
(1934)).
195

Cases dealing with questions of inventorship are distinct from those determining
patent invalidity. When evaluating inventorship, a court must determine who was
involved in the creation of, and usually who owns rights in, the invention. In Morgan v.
Daniels, the Court characterized a case disputing the true inventor of a patent as putting
aside the PTO’s conclusions, which could not occur by a mere preponderance of the
evidence. 153 U.S. 120, 122-24 (1894). Later, in another case disputing inventorship,
the Court held that a patent’s presumption of validity may not be overcome except by a
showing of “clear and cogent evidence.” Radio Corp. of Am., 293 U.S. at 1, 2 (1934).
The Court based its conclusion on its recognition that the requirement of a heavy burden
of proof was a central truth among the cases rather than on giving deference to the PTO
as the Federal Circuit did in American Hoist. Compare Radio Corp. of Am., 293 U.S. at
7-8, with Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Alternatively,
when evaluating patent invalidity, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated the
standard of proof prior to the present case. In fact, the various courts of appeals prior to
the establishment of the Federal Circuit were split on the appropriate standard, as some
courts gave deference to the PTO because the expert agency was presumed to have done
its job, while others declined to give such deference, especially for art that was not
previously considered by the PTO. See supra note 61; discussion supra Part I.
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[51] Next, the Court addressed whether a different standard should
apply when the PTO has not previously considered prior art. 196 Again, the
Court looked to what Congress had established and pre-1952 cases such as
Radio Corp. of America. 197 Section 282 codified the common law
presumption of patent validity. 198 The clear and convincing standard was
implicitly codified with the presumption of validity. 199 Nothing in § 282
suggests a divergence from that meaning. 200 There is certainly no
indication that Congress intended to establish a dual standard in which
some prior art is evaluated using the clear and convincing standard while
other prior art is considered on the preponderance of the evidence
standard. 201 While the Court acknowledged pre-1952 courts of appeals
cases that featured a lower standard when prior art was not considered
previously by the PTO, it refused to imply that Congress’s Patent Act
included that lower standard. 202 Rather, it held that those cases reflected
the Federal Circuit’s principle that new evidence of patent invalidity may
“carry more weight” than previously considered evidence. 203 The burden
of proof remains the same, though the newly considered prior art can
significantly help a challenge to a patent’s validity. 204
196

Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2249.

197

See id. at 2249-50.

198

Id.

199

Id.

200

Id. at 2250. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).

201

202

Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2250-51.
Id.

203

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011) (citing Am. Hoist &
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
204

Id.
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[52] The Court also briefly touched upon various policy arguments and
concluded that the Federal Circuit has applied the same heightened
standard of proof for nearly thirty years, while Congress, who has often
amended § 282, has not once even considered lowering the standard of
proof. 205 Congress has expanded re-examination proceedings to provide
for inter partes proceedings to address policy concerns over issuing “bad”
patents. 206 Any further changes to the common law presumption of
validity and accompanying standard of proof, which were codified in §
282, should only be made at Congress’s discretion. 207
[53] Though there is room to question the Supreme Court’s reasoning,
it arrived at the correct result to maintain the status quo. 208 The Court’s
statements addressing the policy arguments were dead on. It is for
Congress to act to change the well-established heightened burden of proof
regarding questions of patent validity. 209 While this is the correct
conclusion at law, the Court provided further instruction that may
effectively employ a dual standard. 210 Unfortunately, the Court stated that
an available and appropriate means for giving new prior art additional
weight is through jury instruction. 211 According to the Court, a jury may
be instructed to consider that particular prior art has not previously been
considered by the PTO, that it is disputed whether the prior art presented
before the jury is identical to what was presented to the PTO, or that new
205

Id. at 2252.

206

Id.

207

Id. at 2252.

208

See Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2252.

209

Id. at 2252.

210

See id. at 2250-51.

211

Id.
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evidence is “materially new.” 212 The Court then stated that Microsoft had
failed to request such an instruction and that it was too late in litigation to
do so. 213 So, the clear and convincing standard broadly applies when
determining questions of patent validity, and a jury instruction may be
used to highlight that certain prior art references were not previously
considered by the PTO to provide those references with more weight. 214
[54] To reiterate the harmful effects of the dual standard, it will likely
confuse jurors, distract the focus of litigation, and flood the PTO with
prior art. 215 Here, the jury instruction distinguishes between prior art that
was previously considered and not previously considered by the PTO. 216
Such a distinction is intended to maintain the same standard for all prior
art while giving more weight to prior art that has not previously been
considered. 217 This distinction works in theory. Jurors would hear one
standard of proof, the clear and convincing standard, followed by a jury
instruction reminding them that certain prior art has not been considered
by the PTO. However, the jury instruction is more likely to result in jurors
employing a dual standard. Even worse, jurors might employ a standard
less than the clear and convincing standard out of confusion. Though the
law has not changed, the risks presented by the dual standard remain.
[55] Consider the potential impact of a jury instruction in Microsoft.
Because Microsoft did not corroborate the alleged co-inventor’s

212

Id. at 2251.

213

Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2251.

214

See id. at 2250-51.

215

See discussion supra Part IV.

216

Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2251.

217

Id.
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testimony, it could not meet the clear and convincing standard. 218 As the
Supreme Court articulated, the standard does not change. 219 Rather, prior
art not previously considered by the PTO carries more weight. 220
Regardless of the weight given to prior art, Microsoft needed
corroborating evidence to meet the heightened standard. 221 If correctly
applied, the jury instruction would have had no effect because the
available evidence could not meet the clear and convincing standard. 222
Any other application of the jury instruction would have diluted the
heightened standard into one that could be overcome without
corroborating evidence because more weight would be given to prior art
that had not previously been considered. Jurors are generally not legal
scholars. Thus, the jury instruction provides a potentially devastating
source of confusion. The only way Microsoft could have proven that the
‘449 patent was invalid was with a lower standard of proof. Microsoft’s
attorneys were already able to emphasize to the jury that the PTO had not
previously considered certain prior art references. 223 The jury instruction
suggested by the Court is unwarranted and potentially harmful because it
invites the jury to practically apply a dual standard.
[56] Bad facts make bad law. The Court did well to maintain the status
quo despite these facts. 224 Rather than attempting to address these unusual
facts with a jury instruction, the Court should have heeded its own advice
218

See id. at 2247-48; see also Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d
1279, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
219

Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2251 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.,
725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
220

Id.

221

See id. at 2247-48; see also Symantec Corp., 522 F.3d at 1295-96.
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See Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2247-48.
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Id. at 2251.

224

Id. at 2252.
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and allowed Congress to make the changes necessary to address these
circumstances. Even with the jury instruction, however, Congress can still
act to address concerns with the broad application of the clear and
convincing standard, namely expanding reexamination to include all
challenges to patent validity. Congress needs to take such action to
prevent bad facts from being used to make bad law.
VII.

CONCLUSION

[57] Courts should continue to broadly require a showing of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome a patent’s presumption of validity. This
heightened standard gives deference to the PTO as the expert agency and
enables business owners to rely on a patent’s presumption of validity in
making business decisions. Lowering the standard to preponderance of
the evidence would be inappropriate when prior art has been previously
considered by the PTO or when reexamination is available. This is
because it eliminates the deference to the PTO, which businesses rely
upon when making decisions. Despite unique situations where the PTO
has not previously considered prior art and reexamination is unavailable,
the clear and convincing standard should still be broadly applied. Courts
should not be compelled by unique facts, like those in Microsoft, to
employ a dual standard where some evidence must rise to the level of
clear and convincing while other evidence need only show invalidity by a
preponderance of the evidence. Such a dual standard would result in juror
confusion, direct the focus of litigation on whether the PTO had
previously considered prior art, and encourage applicants to flood the PTO
with prior art. Further, changing the standard of proof for overcoming a
patent’s presumption of patent validity is a decision for Congress rather
than the courts. Therefore, courts should continue to broadly apply the
clear and convincing standard to challenges of a patent’s presumption of
validity.
[58] The Court did well to maintain the status quo despite the
compelling facts in Microsoft. Unfortunately, the Court approved of a
potential jury instruction to identify prior art that had not been previously
considered by the PTO. Such a jury instruction would practically
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implement a dual standard or dilute the clear and convincing standard into
a lower standard of proof. The Court should have stopped after holding
the clear and convincing standard as the appropriate standard of proof for
broad application. Creating ways to address bad facts, like those in
Microsoft, is a job for Congress. Courts should broadly apply the clear
and convincing standard to challenges of a patent’s presumption of
validity. To do otherwise in light of bad facts allows bad facts to make
bad law.
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